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1Highlights
We study the dynamic effects of monetary policy on the banking sector in Nigeria.
We show that the Bank Lending Channel improved   banks resilience to monetary shocks.
Our study of the Bank Lending Channel reveals the importance of banks size and equity.
Larger banks and more capitalised banks are less sensitive to changes in monetary policy.
The Central Banks restructuring activities improved the bank lending channels impact.
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31.0 Introduction
Our study examines the Bank Lending Channel (BLC) in Nigeria between 2002 and 2008. 
During the nineties, the Nigerian Banking system faced a severe crisis that culminated in the 
failure of a large number of commercial banks. These banks failed for two reasons: (i) a large 
number of small under-capitalised banks became burdened by a high volume of non-performing 
loans. (ii) a central bank whose monetary policy objectives were hampered by fiscal indiscipline. 
The financial crisis that occurred in the banking system during the 1990’s contributed to 
the insolvency of almost 50% of financial institutions. So beginning from 1996, the central bank 
introduced two major reforms that altered significantly the banking landscape in Nigeria. The 
first major reform by the central bank of Nigeria (CBN) enforced a series of increases in 
minimum paid-up capital requirements. According to Somoye (2008), in 1996 there were 112 
banks but by 2006, further increases in the minimum paid-up capital reduced the number of banks to 
25 banks. The second major reform was in 2005 when the CBN began a program of 
unprecedented credit expansion to commercial banks. The purpose of this reform was to expand 
the supply of capital to re-capitalize failed banks to revive the financial system. These reforms 
have enabled some of these twenty-five banks to become key players in African Global Financial 
Markets.
There  has been extensive research on the BLC in U.S and Europe. Kashyap and Stein 
(1995), Kasian and Opiela (2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Favero et al. (1999), Ashcraft (2006), 
Matousek and Sarantis (2009) among others. However, there have only been limited studies on the 
BLC in Africa such as Ludi and Ground (2006) and Hsing and Hsei (2014).
4More so fewer of these studies (mainly on Southern Africa) have used sectoral data such as 
Lungu (2007) and Abuka et al. (2015). So we have identified a gap in research on the transmission 
of monetary policy through the Nigerian banking system. In particular, we explain why following 
the financial crisis in the 1990’s, a restructuring of the banking system was needed to restore the 
ability of banks to reconcile shifts in monetary policy. In this study, we test whether monetary 
restrictions on bank loans differ according to bank size, capital strength and liquidity. To test the 
BLC, we apply the GMM estimator and the Bias Corrected Fixed Effects estimator using a sample 
of 23 banks from 2002 to 2008. We apply the latter in order to control for the bias that arises when 
applying GMM estimator to small dynamic panels. 
From the foregoing, our study will contribute to our understanding of whether the process 
of consolidation and restructuring increased the ability of the Nigerian banking system to withstand 
monetary shocks. Therefore, our study contributes to the ongoing discussion as to whether the BLC 
is weakened or strengthened by bank consolidation and restructuring activities. 
Our study shows that the BLC in Nigeria was strengthened by the consolidation process 
during the period 2002 and 2008. Furthermore, smaller and less capitalized banks are more 
responsive to changes in monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the evolution 
of the banking sector in Nigeria. Section 3 provides a literature review on recent empirical research 
on the BLC. This section also provides an overview of the available empirical research on the BLC. 
Section 4 explains the methodology while Section 5 describes our dataset. Section 6 explains the 
estimation procedure and reports the results. Finally Section 7 concludes.
2. An Overview of Monetary Policy and the Banking Sector in Nigeria
5According to CBN (CBN, 2006), the main objectives of monetary policy is price stability and 
sustenance of economic growth. The CBN’s monetary policy can be clearly split into two phases: 
the period before the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1986 and the period beyond 1986. 
According to CBN (CBN, 2006), the main objectives of monetary policy is price 
stability and sustenance of economic growth. The CBN’s monetary policy can be clearly split 
into two phases: the period before the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1986 and 
the period beyond 1986.
Prior to 1986, monetary policy was implemented by directly controlling both the interest 
rate and exchange rate. The idea was to channel cheap credit to the sectors of the economy that 
was viewed to be at the vanguard of growth and development (Yinusa and Akinlo, 2008). In 
reality, the attempt to use interest and exchange rates respectively to achieve set targets in 
growth were rarely achieved (Ibeabuchi, 2007). Instead these policies contributed to 
distortions, bottlenecks and widespread inefficiencies and wastage in resource allocation. 
The period that trailed the SAP era witnessed more policy reversals than any other 
period. Monetary policy moved from liberalization to direct control and back to liberalization 
between 1986 and 1998 (World Bank, 1983). This was irrespective of the clear guidelines 
concerning the practice of monetary policy as encapsulated in the Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Decree (BOFID, 1991). The inconsistencies in monetary policy were also due to 
the failed attempt of the CBN to prevent money supply from amplifying the effects of the 
economic recession that occurred between 1986 and 1998. 
Part of the problem for the CBN was that apart from the primary objectives of price 
stability and sustenance of economic growth, it also set some secondary objectives.  The secondary 
objectives were full employment, maintenance of stable long-term interest rates, optimal exchange 
6rate targets and strengthening of the banking system (Saxegaard, 2006). Its primary objectives often 
conflicted with its secondary objectives and this complicated the crafting of a proper monetary 
policy. For example, the CBN had trouble achieving set targets in reserve money (operational 
target) and broad money (intermediate target). This made it difficult for the CBN to maintain price 
stability and growth (Ibeabuchi, 2007). Furthermore, fiscal indiscipline on the part of the 
government made it difficult for the CBN to achieve its objectives of stabilizing money growth. 
During the period between 2001 and 2006, broad money (M2) had expanded by an average of more 
than 24% (BGL, 2006). Also narrow money (M1) expanded by an average of 17.4% between 2001 
and 2005. 
Post 1996, the monetary authorities enforced a series of increases in minimum paid-up 
capital requirements. This was because the 1990’s a financial crisis caused almost half of the banks 
to become insolvent. The origin of the financial crisis began with the liberalization of the financial 
sector which led to small under-capitalized banks with little managerial experience. These new 
entrants were poorly regulated owing to political interference (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 
2000). In 2005, the CBN raised the minimum capital requirement for banks from 2 billion naira 
(approx. $15million) to 25 billion naira (approx. $183million)1. As a result, this led to a drastic 
reduction in the number of banks from 89 to 25. Consequently, this led to the disappearance of 
many small-sized banks with high overhead costs and heavy reliance government patronage 
(Lemo, 2005).  The CBN’s policy of bank consolidation and restructuring has been credited with 
helping Nigerian banks become competitive players primarily in African Financial markets and 
the global financial system.
3. Literature Review
1 The exchange rate at the time fluctuated from 132 naira to the dollar to 136 naira to the dollar.
7Akinci et al. (2014) explain the empirical evidence on the bank lending channel since 1995. 
The essential arguments within the literature are as follows: First, the BLC cannot be identified 
using macroeconomic time series data. Secondly, evidence drawn from disaggregated bank level 
data shows that the response of bank loans to changes in monetary policy depends on three key 
characteristics: asset size, liquidity and capital adequacy. Thirdly, evidence suggests the existence 
of the BLC in Germany, France, Italy and Spain. However, the significance of these results vary 
according to country.  Finally, current research on the BLC shows that it is affected by other 
factors such as bank risk and the global financial crisis. Table 1 summarizes chronologically key 
empirical literature on the BLC. A comparison of the studies shows that more research on the BLC 
has been done in developed countries relative to emerging market and developing economies. 
With respect to Africa, we have identified four studies that test the existence of the BLC. 
The first is by Sichei (2005) who examine the BLC in South Africa using quarterly bank data from 
2001q1 to 2004q4. Two conditions are necessary for the BLC to work: (i) that there are bank 
dependent customers and (ii) that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) can affect the
supply of loans.
Table 1: A Summary of Key Literature on the BLC.
Author Main Findings
Favero et al. (1999) Did not find the presence of the BLC in Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain in 1992.
De Bondt (1999) BLC found to be present in Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands.
8Kishan and Opiela (2000) BLC found to be present in the U.S between 1980 and 
1995. The supply of loans is more sensitive to bank size 
irrespective of the levels of capitalization.
Altunbas et al. (2002) BLC found in 11 European countries in the EMU. The 
supply of loans is more sensitive to bank capital. 
Kakes and Sturm (2002) BLC found to be present in Germany. The supply of 
loans is sensitive to bank size.
Ehrmann et al. (2003) BLC found to be present in Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain using micro and aggregate data.
Gamborta (2005) BLC found to be present in Italy. The supply of loans is 
sensitive to capitalization and liquidity.
Ludi and Ground (2006) Using VAR’s do not find the BLC in South Africa.
Lungu (2007) Mixed results found for the existence of the BLC in 
South African Developing Countries (SADC) from   
1990 to 2006.
Matousek and Sarantis (2009) BLC found to be present in 8 CEE countries. The 
supply of loans is sensitive to bank size and liquidity.
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez(2011) Finds significant changes in the operation of BLC EU 
member states and the U.S following the 2007 financial 
crisis. The supply of loans is sensitive to banks with 
short-term funding as well as banks with more 
profitable but volatile non-interest income activities.
Oliviero et al. (2011a) BLC is weakened by the consolidation process in 18 
Asian and Latin American countries.
Butt et al. (2014) Quantitative Easing boosted the BLC in the U.K.
Hsing and Hsei, (2014) Use a simultaneous equation model to identify the BLC 
in South Africa using aggregate data.
Simpasa et al. (2014) BLC not found to exist in Zambia.
Abuka et al. (2015) BLC found to be present in Uganda. Furthermore, an 
increase in the interest rate reduces the probability that 
loans are granted as well as reduces the volume of local 
currency loans to borrowers The supply of loans is 
sensitive to bank capital. 
The bank characteristics considered in the study were capital-asset ratio and bank size. 
The results show that an increase in the repo rate (the base rate in South Africa). Large banks tend 
to attract more deposits relative to banks characterized by higher capital-asset ratios. This 
confirms the first condition. For the second condition, the results support the existence of the bank 
9lending channel in South Africa. An increase in the repo rate has a negative and significant effect 
on the supply on the supply of loans. Furthermore, estimates on the joint effect of size and capital-
asset ratios respectively showed that large banks as well as highly capitalized banks are able to 
cushion the effects of contractionary monetary policy. 
A second study by Walker (2012) attempts to examine the existence of the BLC in five 
countries that make up the East African Community namely: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Uganda. The bank characteristics considered in the study where bank capitalization, size and 
liquidity. The bank characteristics considered in the study where bank capitalization, size and 
liquidity. Their results showed that an increase in the interest rate has a negative and significant 
effect on the supply of loans. Furthermore, the results also showed that large banks as well as 
highly capitalized banks are able to cushion the effects of contractionary monetary policy. 
However, the results should be interpreted with caution as the effects of the BLC was found not 
to be significant when tested on a country-by-country basis. Other studies that have examined the 
existence of the BLC in Africa include: Lungu, (2007), Hsing and Hsei, (2014), Simpasa et al. (2014) 
and Abuka et al. (2015). 
The BLC channel in Nigeria has not been investigated using panel data techniques. Therefore, 
we seek to build on existing research by using panel data techniques to estimate the distributional 
effects of monetary policy within the banking sector for Nigeria.
4.0 Model Specification
































ωizit - 1Rt - j + εit…(1)
Where  denotes the number of banks,  is the time period and  is the number of lags. denotes N T J Lit 
the size of bank loans for each bank .  denotes the monetary policy instrument which is the short- i Rt - j
term nominal interest rate,  denotes the Gross Domestic Product, denotes the Consumer GDPt - j CPIt - j 
Price Index and  is a dummy variable for whether the bank is foreign owned. The dummy variable ownt
takes value of 0 if the bank is not foreign owned and 1 if the reverse is the case.  denotes the vector of zi
three bank characteristics: bank size, liquidity and bank capitalization for each bank. Finally,   zitRt - j
denotes the interaction between bank specific characteristics and the short-term nominal interest rate.
Our approach to estimating the BLC is motivated by the literature on dynamic panel estimation 
such as Arellano and Bond (1991), Islam(1995) and  Ziliak(1997). In order to apply the Arellano and 
Bond estimator, we take the first differences of (1) and this yields equation (2)





























ωizit - 1ΔRt - j + εit…(2)
In the first stage of our estimation we applied the Arellano and Bond estimator. However, 
there were some issues concerning the robustness of the estimates. Consequently, we applied the 
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Arellano-Blunder/Bond and Bover estimator as well the Windmeijer estimator to reduces the 
problem of biased coefficients. 
In both models, the distributional effects of monetary policy on banks are captured by the 
interaction between the monetary policy indicators (i.e. interest rate2) and the individual bank 
characteristics. The bank characteristic variables i.e. Bank size, liquidity, capitalization are defined 
as in Ehrmann et al. (2003), Gambacorta (2005), Matousek and Sarantis (2009) as follows:















T∑t (1N∑t EquityitAit )…(5)
Bank size is defined as the log of Total Assets. In order to control for the trend in size, Total 
Assets for each bank is normalized by subtracting the log of total assets for each bank from the 
sample average. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets. Capitalization is 
defined as the ratio of Equity to Total Assets. As with bank size, the latter two bank characteristics 
are normalized by subtracting from the sample average for each single period and over the whole 
period.3
We now proceed to explain the hypothesis tests and the a-priori expectations with respect to 
the sign of the interaction terms. In order to test for the existence of the bank lending channel, we 
test if (i) smaller bank are more sensitive to changes in monetary policy (ii) less liquid banks are 
more sensitive to changes in monetary policy and (iii) less capitalized banks are more sensitive to 
2 We also experiment with using changes in money supply as an alternative measure of the monetary policy stance. We 
found that the supply of loans is more sensitive to changes in interest rate than changes in money supply.
3 This approach was adopted Ehrmann et  al.(2003)
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changes in monetary policy. We expect a-priori, the interaction between bank size and changes in 
interest rate to be positive because lending by small banks are more sensitive to changes in interest 
rates relative to large banks. Secondly, we expect the interaction between interest rate and liquidity 
to be positive because liquidity constrained banks are more sensitive to changes in the interest rate 
relative to small banks. This is because more liquid banks are able to provide more lending by 
drawing down on their stock of liquid assets. Finally, we also expect the interaction between bank 
capitalization and the interest rates to be positive because more capitalized banks are less sensitive 
to changes in monetary policy.
Balli and Sorensen (2013) demonstrate that adding interaction terms (product of the 
independent variables) can lead to bias in the estimation of the main terms i.e. independent variables. 
This is because of the coefficient of the interaction terms have a strong influence on the main term. 
Consequently, it changes the meaning of the main term as the marginal effect when the other 
interaction term is zero. In our paper, the inclusion of the interaction term is necessary in order to 
test the null hypothesis of the existence of the BLC. Our hypothesis is based on a two-tail test. 
Consequently, we do not drop the interaction terms if they are not significant as it contributes to 
evaluating our hypotheses on the BLC. Furthermore, dropping the interaction terms4 will increase 
the risk of specification error as they are the main variables of interest. We also do not include 
quadratic terms as suggested by Bali and Sorenson (2013) because we have a large number of 
regressors.
5.0 Data
Disaggregated annual bank data was obtained directly from the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) for twenty-three banks from 2002 to 2008. There are 25 consolidated banks in Nigeria but 
4 We only drop the interaction terms if their inclusion violates the Sargan/Hansen tests as well as tests for 
autorcorrelation.
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our sample is limited to 23 of those banks owing to data availability5. The data obtained were bank 
capital, liquid assets, equity and total assets6. We also collected annual data on interest rates and 
inflation from the CBN statistical database. Finally, we collected annual data on growth in Gross 
Domestic Output from the World Bank7. 
Our sample covers the period when the CBN introduced its policy of consolidation and 
restructuring within the banking sector following the financial crisis that took place in the nineties8.  
Consequently, this is an interesting period to study the impact of CBN’s policy in the monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the banking sector in Nigeria and some 
macroeconomic indicators. During the period between 2002 and 2008, the average growth in bank 
loans was   20%. Approximately 9% of the 23 banks in our sample are foreign owned. There has also 
been significant volatility in growth of loans ranging from a decline of 22% to a maximum 
TABLE 2: Summary Statistics (2002 to 2008)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth in Loan 
Supply
137 0.203 0.201 -0.222 1.056
Foreign Owned 
Banks
161 0.087 0.283 0 1
Growth in Bank 
Size
137 .0301 0.039 -0.133 0.156
Growth in 
Liquidity
137 -.0102    . 2.29 -1.460 0.784
5 The banks used in the sample were: Access Bank, AfriBank, Diamond Bank, EcoBank,  Equitorial Trust Bank, First 
City Monument Bank,Fidelity Bank, First Bank Plc, First Inland Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, IBTC- Chartered Bank, 
Intercontinental, Nigeria International Bank, Oceanic Bank, Platinum Bank, Skye Bank, Spring Bank, Stanbic Bank, 
Standard Chartered Bank, United Bank for Africa, Sterling Bank, Union Bank, Unity Bank, Wema Bank, Zenith Bank 
Plc.
6 The data was used to compute bank size, liquidity and capitalization as defined in equations (3), (4) and (5). 
7 We used the Log of GDP in the estimation. 




137 0.022 0.09 -0.282 0.310
Growth Rate of 
output
137 0.0780 0.04 0 0.126
Inflation Rate 137 -0.146 5.46 -13.00 7.00
Growth of 
Money Supply
137 0.290 0.13 0.13 0.496
Interest Rate 
Change
137 -.017 0.012 -0.04 0
growth of 106%. With respect to the bank characteristics, average growth in the size of banks has 
been around 3%, liquidity decreased by an average of 1% while capitalization has expanded by about 
2.2%.  Furthermore, the table also shows that there has been substantial variation in the growth of 
these bank characteristics.  
In terms of the monetary policy stance, the central bank expanded monetary policy as 
money supply grew by an average of 28% and interest rates declined by an average of 1.6%. This 
reflects CBN’s policy of credit expansion to commercial banks. Macroeconomic indicators reflect 
the impact of expansionary monetary policy during this period as inflation fell by 14.5% while 
output grew by an average of 7%.
6. Empirical Estimation and Results
6.1 Empirical Estimation 
Our procedure for Generalised Method Moments (GMM) estimation is as follows: We 
begin by applying the Arellano Bond-Blundell and Bover (A-B-B) estimator i.e. GMM two-step 
estimator. We choose this method of estimation for two reasons: (i) The method is consistent 
with Ehrmann et  al.  (2003) who uses dynamic panel model to examine the reaction of bank 
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loans to monetary policy. (ii) it can be used to control for the weak instrument problem because 
the instruments are weakly exogenous. 
One of the limitations of using the A-B estimator is the potential for first-order serial 
correlation in the residuals. This can occur because the instruments that control for endogeneity 
are weakly exogenous. We applied the (A-B-B) estimator to control for the weak instrument 
problem by including instruments with differences as well as instruments in levels. The 
consistency of the A-B-B estimator depends crucially on the assumption that there is no second 
order serial correlation. In addition to the A-B-B estimator, we use the Windmeijer (2005) 
estimator to reduce the problem of biased coefficients. This is particularly useful when the 
number of instruments are large and are weakly exogenous. Secondly, the consistency of the 
estimator is also examined by testing for second order serial correlation where the null hypothesis 
that residuals are uncorrelated.
The consistency of the GMM two-step estimator depends on the validity of the 
instruments. In order to control for the size of the instruments which can lead to over-fitting of 
the model, we applied the “GMM-style collapse command” in Stata. This forces the GMM 
estimator to keep down the number of instruments. The null-hypothesis of weakly exogenous 
instruments is tested using the Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions (Sargan, 1988). We 
also report the Hansen test (Hansen, 1982) as an alternative test for over-identification and that 
the model is correctly specified.   According to Baum et al. (2003), the Hansen test and the Sargan 
test also tests for orthogonal conditions. A rejection of null hypothesis indicates that the 
instruments are not uncorrelated with the error term. 
In each regression, we applied the general-to-specific method with respect to our choice of 
instruments using initially instruments dated at t-2. In total, we used a range of fifteen to twenty 
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instruments. We deleted instruments when its inclusion led to a rejection of second-order 
autocorrelation test and/or the Sargan/Hansen tests respectively. We also experimented with 
allowing the GMM two step estimator to optimally choose the appropriate number of instruments. 
The advantage of this procedure is that it prevents over-fitting the model with additional 
instruments. 
6.1 The Effect of a Change in the Monetary Policy Stance on the Supply of Loans
Table 3 presents the results of the model estimated in equation (2). Following the 
application of the A-B and A-B-B estimators respectively, we do not reject the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are valid according to both the Sargan’s and Hansen statistics respectively. Our 
results show that we do not reject the null hypothesis of second-order serial correlation.  This 
suggests that the model is correctly specified. 
Table 3 reports the results for the effect of a change in interest rate on the supply of 
loans. Each column also reports the estimates of the distributional effects of monetary policy as 
shown by the interaction between the monetary policy stance and the bank characteristic. Column 
(1), (2), (3) were estimated using A-B-B estimator respectively. Column (1) shows the impact 
of bank size on the supply of loans. Column (2) shows the impact of liquidity and column (3) shows 
the impact of capitalization on the supply of loans respectively. 





Δlog(Lit - 1) -0.0772*** 0.382* 0.578***
ΔGDPt 0.305 - -0.017
ΔCPIt -0.0429* 2.235 -2.47
ΔRATEt -7.946*** -27.932*** -25.63***
ΔRATEt - 1 2.965* 13.028 2.712***
Owner Dropped Dropped 1.31*
ΔGDPt - 1 0.461 - -
ΔCPIt - 1 -0.0570* - -3.24*
Sizet - 1 3.224*** -
Sizet - 1∆Ratet 3.121*** -
Sizet - 1∆Ratet - 1 -1.014 -
Liqt - 1 -- 1.315
Liqt - 1ΔRatet -
Liqt - 1ΔRatet - 1 - -0.393
CAPt - - -0.134
CAPt - 1∆Ratet - - -53.773***
CAPt - 1∆Ratet - 1 - - -10.462**







AR(1) (p-value) 0.051 0.056 0.067
AR (2) (p-value) 0.142 0.537 0.914
Sargan (p-value) 0.974 0.175 0.114
Hansen (p-value) 0.354 0.221 0.448
*- 10% significance level, ** - 5% significance level, ***- 1% significance level
This is contrary to our a-priori expectations as higher capitalized banks are more likely to 
supply loans. One reason for the result might be banks end to hold liquidity in excess of legal 
requirements for precautionary purposes. This leads to credit rationing because high interest rates 
increase the risk of lending and price safe borrowers out of the market. As a result, banks are less 
willing to lend even though they have high levels of liquidity (Walker, 2012).
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We now focus on the interaction terms to assess the distributional effects of monetary policy in 
order to test for the existence of the BLC. Columns (1) shows that the interaction between the interest rate 
and size is positive and significant at the 5% level. This means that when the interest rate rises, 
smaller banks increase the supply of loans. In Column (2), the interaction between interest rates 
and liquidity does not show a significant relationship. Columns (3) and (3a), supports our  a-priori 
expectations that highly capitalized banks supply are less sensitive to changes in monetary policy. The 
relationship is weakly significant at the 10% level. However, after a lag of one year, the interaction 
between the interest rate and capitalization becomes negative and significant. This suggests that 
measures by the CBN to increase the level of capital may have contributed to credit rationing 
among banks. 
The signif icance of the jo in t  effect  of  monetary policy and in  the three bank 
characteristics confirm that the consolidation and restructuring activities strengthened the bank 
lending channel. The corollary to this is that efforts by the CBN to strengthen the banking sector 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis improved the monetary transmission mechanism. According 
to Bond et al. (2001), using a pooled regression will bias the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable upwards while using fixed effects regression will bias the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable downwards. Consequently, we expect the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable to be between the corresponding OLS and fixed effects values respectively. The results of 
the estimation using OLS and fixed effects are presented in Appendix A. More detailed results are 
available upon request from the owner. The results correspond to the Bond et al. (1990).
7.0 Conclusion
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The paper investigates for the first time the bank lending channel in Nigeria from 2002 to 
2008. During this period, the Central Bank of Nigeria introduced a policy of consolidation and 
restricting in the banking system following the financial crisis in the 1990’s. This resulted in a 
drastic reduction in the number of banks from 89 to 25. There are few studies that examine the 
bank lending channel using sectoral data in Africa. Therefore, our paper contributes to the literature 
by using sectoral data to study the role of banks in the monetary transmission mechanism in Nigeria. 
Using the method of GMM, the empirical results support the hypothesis that there is a 
significant BLC in Nigeria following the period of consolation. We find that bank size, liquidity and 
capitalization are significant determinants for loan supply.
Among these bank characteristics, the supply of loans is more sensitive to changes in 
bank size and consolidation. In other words, we find that smaller banks, liquidity constrained 
banks and highly capitalized banks are more sensitive to monetary policy. This shows that the 
BLC was strengthened by the actions of the CBN.
In addition to using the GMM estimator, we also applied Windmeijer estimator to control for 
the bias that can occur when applying GMM to small samples. We also compared our results to 
the results from pooled and fixed effects estimation. The results concur with the literature that 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable from the GMM estimator lies between the values 
of the pooled and fixed effects estimators respectively. The analysis of the BLC represents an 
innovation in the study of the monetary policy transmission in Africa. In our view, further work 
should be carried to examine the BLC in other African countries which attract huge amounts 
of credit through cross-border bank lending.
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Table 4: Pooled-OLS and Fixed Effects of the Specific Model sin Table 3
Fixed Pooled
(1b) (2b) (3b) (1c) (2c) (3c)
Size Liquidity Capital Size Liquidity Capital
Δlog(Lit - 1) -0.399**   0.522*** 0.379*** -0.0130 0.852*** 0.796***
ΔGDPt -0.435** - -0.032*** 0.651 - -0.023***
ΔCPIt -16.62*** 2.193*   3.486* -0.000 3.543*** 2.933
ΔRATEt -2.122 - -5.76*** - -
ΔRATEt - 1 -24.861*** - 2.814 -14.895*** -
ΔGDPt - 1 - 0.0707 - -
ΔCPIt - 1 -1.704 -   -4.064 0.0087 -   -0.450
Sizet - 1 0.239 - -
Sizet - 1∆Ratet -30.251*** - 3.199*** -
Sizet - 1∆Ratet - 1 27.261*** - 2.378*** -
Liqt - 1 0.520 0.210
Liqt - 1ΔRatet -0.153
Liqt - 1ΔRatet - 1 - -0.100
CAPt - -0.317* -0.311**
CAPt - 1∆Ratet - -
CAPt - 1∆Ratet - 1 - 15.638 -2.35
N 137 115 137 137 115 137
*** - 1% significance, **- 5% significance, *** - 10% significance
